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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Lonnie Hust appeals from the district court's dismissal of his untimely 
petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, Hust claims the district court was 
required to rule on his request for counsel before it could dismiss his untimely 
petition. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedinas 
Hust was convicted of lewd conduct with a minor in Washington County 
Case No. CR 05-4439. (R., pp.3, 10.) A Judgment of Conviction was entered on 
June 12, 2006 and an Amended Judgment of Conviction was entered on June 
19, 2006. (R., pp.3, 10.) No appeal from the judgment was taken. (R., p.4.) 
On December 14, 2007, Hust filed a pro se petition and affidavit for post- 
conviction relief and a motion and affidavit in support of appointment of counsel. 
(R., pp.3-7; Exhibit, Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel.) 
The state moved to dismiss Hust's petition as untimely because it was filed more 
than a year after the judgment of conviction became final. (R., pp.8-9.) Hust 
responded to the state's motion to dismiss with argument regarding the merits of 
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim contained in his petition. (R., pp.13- 
15.) Hust also filed a motion to "stay" the state's motion to dismiss "until the 
court grants petitioner's request for counsel." (R., pp.16-17.) 
The district court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition as 
untimely, giving Hust 20 days to respond. (R., pp.10-12.) As he did with the 
state's motion, Hust responded to the district court's notice with argument 
regarding the merits of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim contained in 
his petition. (R., pp.18-20.) Hust also, in his response to the district court's 
notice of intent to dismiss, clarified that by his request for counsel he was 
seeking "Counsel to assist him in perfecting his First Direct Appeal, not this post- 
conviction relief petition." (R., p.19.) 
On March 19, 2008, 65 days after notifying Hust of its intent to dismiss his 
petition as untimely and having received no other response, the district court 
dismissed Hust's untimely petition. (R., pp.26-27.) Hust timely appealed. (R.,  
pp.28-31.) 
ISSUES 
Hust states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Hust's post- 
conviction petition prior to ruling on his request for counsel and by 
failing to appoint counsel to assist him in the post conviction 
proceedings? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should this Court decline to consider Hust's appellate claim that the district 
court erred by dismissing Hust's untimely petition prior to ruling on his request 
for counsel because Hust waived this issue when he made clear to the district 
court that he was seeking the appointment of counsel to assist him in a direct 
appeal, and was not seeking counsel to assist him in the post-conviction 
proceedings? 
2. Has Hust failed to meet his burden of establishing the district court abused its 




Hust Waived Any Objection To The District Court's Failure To Rule On His 
Request For Counsel Prior To Dismissins His Untimely Petition 
A. Introduction 
Hust claims on appeal that the district court committed reversible error by 
dismissing Hust's untimely petition without first ruling on his request for counsel. 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) Because Hust made clear to the district court, prior to its 
dismissal of his untimely petition, that he was seeking counsel to assist him on a 
direct appeal and not to assist him in the post-conviction proceedings, Hust has 
waived consideration of this issue on appeal. 
B. Hust Has Waived Any Challenge To The District Court's Response To His 
Request For Counsel 
It is a well-established principle of appellate law that, absent fundamental 
error, the failure to raise an issue before the trial court waives that issue for 
purposes of appeal. State v. McAway, 127 ldaho 54, 60, 896 P.2d 962, 968 
(1995); State v. Martin, 119 ldaho 577, 808 P.2d 1322 (1991). It has also long 
been established law in ldaho that "one may not successfully complain of errors 
one has consented to or acquiesced in. In other words, invited errors are not 
reversible." State v. Caudill, 109 ldaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985) 
(invited error when defendant, not prosecution, introduced testimony to which 
defendant later objected). "The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party 
from asserting an error when his own conduct induces the commission of the 
error." State v. Atkinson, 124 ldaho 816, 820, 864 P.2d 654, 658 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
Whether Hust's claim is viewed as a failure to raise the claim or invited 
error, Hust has waived consideration of his claims on appeal. In response to the 
district court's notice of its intent to dismiss his untimely petition, Hust specifically 
advised the district court he was seeking "Counsel to assist him in perfecting his 
First Direct Appeal, not this post-conviction relief petition." (R., p.19.) By this 
statement, Hust either clarified that his earlier request for counsel was tied to the 
claims contained in his petition - by which he sought restoration of his direct 
appeal rights - or explicitly removed his earlier request for counsel from 
consideration. Under either analysis, Hust informed the district court that he was 
not seeking counsel to assist him in the post-conviction proceedings. Hust is 
estopped on appeal from claiming error in the district court's failure to appoint or 
deny him post-conviction counsel prior to dismissing his untimely petition. This 
Court should therefore decline to consider the merits of Hust's claim. 
Hust Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It 
Dismissed His Untimely Petition Before Rulina On His Request For Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Hust claims that Charboneau v. State, 140 ldaho 789, 102 P.3d 1108 
(2004), required the district court to rule on Hust's request for counsel before it 
could dismiss his untimely petition. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-9.) Hust's claim fails 
because it has no support in the law. His petition was patently untimely, a 
procedural circumstance not addressed nor controlled by Charboneau. Further, 
because his petition was untimely, he failed to raise the possibility of a valid 
claim and cannot show any harm in the court's dismissal of his untimely petition 
before ruling on his request for counsel. Hust has failed to establish any abuse 
of discretion by the district court when it dismissed his untimely petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel to 
represent a post-conviction petitioner pursuant to I.C. 5 19-4904 is discretionary. 
Plant v. State, 143 ldaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 632 (Ct. App. 2007). "in 
reviewing the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings, '[tjhis Court will not set aside the trial court's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous. As to questions of law, this Court exercises free 
review."' Charboneau v. State, 140 ldaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 11 08, 11 11 (2004) 
(quoting Brown v. State, 135 ldaho 676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001)). 
C. Applicable Legal Standards Under I.C. 6 19-4904 
Post-conviction counsel should be appointed if the petitioner qualifies 
financially and "alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim that would 
require further investigation on the defendant's behalf." Swader v. State, 143 
ldaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 ldaho at 793, 102 
P.3d at 11 12. When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the 
abuse of discretion standard as applied to I.C. 3 19-4904 "permits the trial court 
to determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment 
of counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the 
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot 
be expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 
140 ldaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 11 12-13. 
If, on the other hand, the claims are so patently frivolous that there 
appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with 
the assistance of counsel and further investigation, the court may proceed with 
the usual procedure for dismissing meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman 
v. State, 144 ldaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007). The failure to file a 
timely application renders the action frivolous. Swisher v. State, 129 ldaho 467, 
470, 926 P.2d 1314,1317 (Ct. App. 1996). 
D. Hust Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishina The District Court 
Abused Its Discretion When It Dismissed His Untimelv Petition Before 
Ruling On His Request For Counsel 
On appeal, Hust does not assert his post-conviction petition was timely 
filed. Rather, he argues that the district court erred by failing to rule on his 
motion for appointment of counsel prior to dismissing his untimely post- 
conviction petition. Hust cites no authority for his claim that a district court must 
rule on a request for counsel before dismissing a patently untimely petition. 
Instead, Hust cites and relies upon Charboneau's requirement that "when 
'presented with a request for appointed counsel, the court must address this 
request before ruling on the substantive issues in the case." (Appellant's brief, 
p.6 (emphasis in Appellant's brief).) Hust's reliance on Charboneau is 
misplaced, 
1) Charboneau Does Not Require A District Court To Rule On A 
Request For Counsel Before Dismissing An Untimelv Petition 
Hust, citing to Charboneau, claims that the district court erred "by qajiling 
to rule on the motion for appointment of counsel prior to ruling on the substantive 
issues in the case." (Appellant's brief, p.4 (emphasis in original).) The problems 
with this argument begin with the simple fact that the district court has never 
ruled on the "substantive issues in the case," because the district court 
determined that Hust's patently untimely petition was procedurally barred. 
Further, Charboneau does not speak to the question of whether a district court 
must consider or rule on a request for counsel before dismissing a petition that is 
procedurally barred because it is patently untimely. Charboneau speaks only to 
the district court's duty to consider a request for counsel before reaching a 
decision on the substantive merits of the petition.' In short, Charboneau does 
not apply to Hust's situation. 
In Charboneau, the district court "summarily dismissed Charboneau's 
Petition by determining that Charboneau's proffer of 'new evidence' was neither 
new nor admissible evidence to justify a post conviction evidentiary hearing" 
before addressing Charboneau's request for counsel. Charboneau, 140 ldaho at 
792, 102 P.3d at 11 11. The ldaho Supreme Court held this was error: "[bly not 
' The ldaho Court of Appeals in Swisher v. State, 129 ldaho 467, 470, 926 P.2d 
1314, 1317 (Ct. App. 1996), did rule that a district court erred by dismissing a 
patently untimely petition before ruling on a motion for counsel. However, in 
doing so, it stated that it was applying the rule that a court must rule on a request 
for counsel before ruling on the substantive issues in the case, without any 
acknowledgment that it was applying that rule to a procedural, not substantive, 
issue. Swisher, 129 ldaho at 469, 926 P.2d at 1316. 
specifically addressing the appointment of counsel issue before dealing with the 
substantive issues of Charboneau's Petition, the district court abused its 
discretion. ... At a minimum, the trial court must carefully consider the request 
for counsel before reaching a decision on the substantive merits of the petition 
and whether it contains new and admissible evidence." Charboneau, 140 ldaho 
at 793-794, 102 P.3d at 11 12-1 113. Quite simply, Charboneau is silent as to the 
duty of a district judge when confronted with a petition that is procedurally barred 
because it is patently untimely. 
Because the question of whether a petition is barred because it is patently 
untimely is a procedural one, it is not subject to the timing requirements set forth 
in Charboneau. Hust's claim that Charboneau mandates a finding that the 
district court abused its discretion fails. 
2) An Untimelv Petition Does Not Present The Possibilitv Of A Valid 
Claim: Anv Error By The District Court In Dismissing The Untimelv 
Petition Before Ruling On The Recluest For Counsel Is Harmless 
Even if the holding in Charboneau could be construed to require a district 
court to rule on a request for counsel before dismissing an untimely petition, 
Hust's untimely petition was patently frivolous, and did not entitle him to the 
appointment of counsel. Hust can demonstrate no possible prejudice from the 
district court's dismissal of his untimely petition before ruling on his request for 
counsel. 
In order to be eligible for appointment of counsel, Hust's petition had to 
present the possibility of a valid post-conviction claim. Charboneau, 140 ldaho 
at 793, 102 P.3d at 11 12. Hust's petition did not present such a possibility, as 
the district court explained in its Notice of Intent to Dismiss: 
The Petitioner was convicted of two counts of Lewd and 
Lascivious Conduct with a Minor on June 12, 2006. An Amended 
Judgment and Commitment was filed on June 19, 2006. He was 
sentenced to a total of eight (8) years, the first one and one-half 
(1 %) of which were fixed. The Defendant filed a Motion pursuant to 
ldaho Criminal Rule 35, which was denied by an Order filed 
November 17, 2006. On December 14, 2007, the Petitioner filed 
this Application for Post-Conviction Relief. 
Under ldaho Code 3 19-4902, an application for post- 
conviction relief may be filed at any time within one (1) year from 
the expiration of the time for appeal. Under the circumstances of 
this case, the Petitioner had, at the latest, until July 31, 2006 to file 
an appeal. I.A.R. 14(a). He failed to do so. Thus, any petition for 
post-conviction relief, in order to be timely, was required to be filed 
by July 31, 2007. The Petitioner did not file this Application until 
December 14,2007, well beyond the time limit set for such a filing. 
(R., pp.10-12.) Although given the opportunity to do so, Hust did not respond to 
this notice with any information that would explain why his petition had been 
untimely filed. Hust therefore raised no issue of material fact with regard to the 
timeliness of his petition, Kirkland v. State, 143 ldaho 544, 546, 149 P.3d 819, 
821 (2007) ("a court can dismiss a petition on its own initiative based on 
untimeliness if there is no material issue of fact"), and its patent untimeliness 
rendered the petition and any claims contained therein frivolous, Swisher, 129 
ldaho at 470, 926 P.2d at 1317 (a petition for post-conviction relief that is time- 
barred is frivolous). 
Because the dismissal of Hust's post-conviction petition as untimely was 
inevitable, regardless of whether his motion for appointment of counsel was 
granted, he cannot demonstrate any prejudice in the district court's dismissal of 
his untimely petition before ruling on his request for counsel. In Swisher v. State, 
129 ldaho 467, 470-471, 926 P.2d 1314, 1317-1318 (Ct. App. 1996), the ldaho 
Court of Appeals examined a similar situation and ruled: 
It is thus apparent that Swisher's alleged claims for post- 
conviction relief were time-barred more than a year before his 
application was filed. The action is therefore frivolous. Swisher's 
counsel on appeal has not identified any steps that could have 
been taken by an attorney, if counsel had been appointed to 
represent Swisher before the trial court, that might have prevented 
dismissal of this action. After having independently reviewed the 
record, we can perceive no substantial rights of Swisher that were 
or might have been impaired by the trial court's oversight in failing 
to make a timely ruling on Swisher's request for counsel. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's failure to consider 
Swisher's motion for appointed counsel before dismissing his 
action was harmless error. 
As was true in Swisher, there was nothing an attorney could have done in 
Hust's case to make his post-conviction petition timely, or to excuse its 
untimeliness. When given the opportunity by the district court below, Hust did 
not even attempt to excuse the late filing of his petition. On appeal, he has, like 
Swisher, failed to "identify[y] any steps that could have been taken by an 
attorney, if counsel had been appointed to represent [Hust] before the trial court, 
that might have prevented dismissal of this action." As he did below, Hust on 
appeal chooses to focus on the merits of his substantive claim without reference 
or regard to the patent untimeliness of his petition, 
Because Hust's post-conviction claims are procedurally time-barred they 
are also frivolous, and Hust was not entitled to appointment of counsel to pursue 
those frivolous claims. Hust has failed to demonstrate any error or possible 
prejudice in the district court's dismissal of his untimely post-conviction petition 
before ruling on his request for counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the district court's order dismissing 
Hust's petition for post-conviction be affirmed. 
DATED this 23rd day of January, 200 
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